Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally?
U.S. Jurisdiction over International Cartels
ChristopherSprigmant

The American antitrust laws "do not regulate the competitive
conditions of other nations' economies."' But they do regulate conduct, even when it occurs abroad, that harms domestic competition.
"[I]t is well established" that the Sherman Act reaches "foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substan-

tial effect in the United States."2
This jurisdictional "effects" test is theoretically simple, but difficult to apply. One recurring problem is determining whether foreign

victims injured abroad by cartels may bring damages claims in U.S.
courts. Skirmishes over jurisdiction have featured prominently in
many of the private suits that have followed the mid-1990s upsurge in
government anticartel enforcement, and circuit courts have split over
the proper interpretation of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act' (FTAIA), a statute that was meant to provide, but has
failed to deliver, clarity respecting the Sherman Act's extraterritorial

reach. With the issue ripe for resolution, the Supreme Court in December 2003 granted certiorari in F Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd v Empa-

gran S.A.,' a case involving claims pressed by foreign victims of the
global vitamins cartel.

Resolution is, unfortunately, not what we got. The Court issued an
opinion reversing the D.C. Circuit,' but what the Court actually did
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cannot, on any fair reading, be understood as a reversal. Rather, the
Court constructed a hypothetical -whether jurisdiction extends to
claims of foreigners who suffer foreign harm "independent" from the
domestic harm caused by a cartel-and refused to extend jurisdiction
in such a situation.
This Essay attempts, briefly, to sketch the opinion that the Court
might have written in Empagran had it addressed the real jurisdictional issue, rather than a hypothetical orthogonal to the case. Law
review articles second-guessing Supreme Court decisions can be entertaining and even correct but are usually futile. In this case, however,
futility is not inevitable. The Court remanded to the D.C. Circuit for a
determination of whether the plaintiffs' injury is "independent" of
domestic harm. For reasons I hope to make clear, the D.C. Circuit
should find that foreign and domestic injuries are connected, and, on
that basis, allow the suit to proceed. On the same premises, most cases
involving claims of foreign plaintiffs will proceed.
If we're focusing narrowly on subject matter jurisdiction, that's
probably the right answer. But if we think more broadly about the
purpose of our antitrust laws and our long-term interest in deterring
cartels, it's clear that the effects test has been asked to bear too much
weight. We need jurisdictional rules that encourage the spread of antitrust enforcement responsibility. Unfortunately, however, throughout
the recent litigation over the meaning of the FTAIA, courts have focused on (and often botched) the narrow statutory interpretation
questions while neglecting the broader enterprise of developing jurisdictional doctrines appropriate to a globalized economy that induces
globalized cartels.
In this Essay, I argue that the Empagran Court has gotten the jurisdiction question wrong-it has misapplied the effects test as codified in the FTAIA-but that the right answer does not have to mean
what the Court fears it does. Rather, by reintroducing comity considerations into a "jurisdictional rule of reason," courts will no longer be
obliged to distort the test for subject matter jurisdiction in order to
conserve U.S. judicial resources, respect the autonomy of other nations, and promote the long-term development and convergence of
antitrust regimes around the world.
To that end this Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I examines how
courts and Congress have approached extraterritorial application of
antitrust law, and traces how subject matter jurisdiction has come to

7
Id at 2372 (noting that the Court assumed the injury was independent, but that this was
a factual issue to be resolved by the D.C. Circuit on remand).
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dominate the analysis and supplant other doctrines that should play a
role, including and most importantly, comity.
I argue that the Empagran decision, had it addressed the issues
squarely, would have found jurisdiction under the effects test. However, a finding of jurisdiction, even when permitted by the effects test,
does not always serve the policy interests of the United States. In Part
II, I suggest that rather than do violence to the effects test, courts
should reintroduce an expanded analysis that incorporates comity
considerations as a second filter supplementing the effects test.
I. THE "EFFECTS TEST" IN THE COURTS AND CONGRESS

A. The Effects Test as a Threshold Inquiry
To understand why the Supreme Court came out as it did in Empagran, it is helpful to look back at the early development of the effects test. The first disputes concerned whether the Sherman Act applied at all to foreign conduct. In American Banana Co v United Fruit
Co,' the Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes, held that the Act
regulated only conduct occurring inside U.S. territory
That narrow approach began almost immediately to break down.
Two years after American Banana,the Court upheld, in United States v
American Tobacco Co," a decree ordering the dissolution of a U.K.based cartel composed of British and American tobacco companies."
And in the years following American Tobacco, courts continued to
apply the Sherman Act to foreign conduct, at least when some of the
impugned conduct occurred domestically and some of the parties
were American.2
American Banana'sdesuetude became clear, however, only three
decades later, when Judge Learned Hand confronted a foreign cartel
in United States v Aluminum Co of America3 (Alcoa). Alcoa involved
agreements among the Canadian subsidiary of a U.S. firm and several
European firms to limit production of aluminum ingot. No U.S.domiciled company was found to have participated. Judge Hand
found that the agreements nonetheless violated the Sherman Act "if
they were intended to affect imports [into the United States] and did

8

213 US 347 (1909).

9
Id at 359.
10 221 US 106 (1911).

11 Idat 187.
12 See, for example, United States v Sisal Sales Corp, 274 US 268, 276 (1927) (applying the
Sherman Act to conduct that occurred both in the United States and Mexico).
13 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir 1945).
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affect them."' And because the government had demonstrated intent,
the burden shifted to defendants to show lack of effect."
Alcoa thus laid down an "effects" test that emerged as the juris16
dictional standard. The test, at least as implemented, has focused on
objective evidence of effect." The intent element dutifully has been

included in most courts' articulations of the test," but in practice is
usually ignored. This is perhaps not surprising given the difficulty of
discerning intent, but something valuable was lost in the compression
process: the intent element marked a concern with principles of comity missing from a purely objective test. As Judge Hand wrote in Alcoa:
There may be agreements made beyond our borders not intended to affect imports, which do affect them, or which affect
exports.... [W]hen one considers the international complications
likely to arise from an effort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume that Congress certainly did
not intend the Act to cover them."
Three decades after Alcoa, comity concerns began to reemerge.
The Ninth Circuit, in its opinion in Timberlane Lumber Co v Bank of
America,2° suggested that the objective test did not account adequately

for the interests of foreign states in judging conduct occurring within
their territories. 2' Reconceptualizing the effects test as the threshold
element of a broader analysis, the Timberlane court proposed a tripar-

tite "jurisdictional rule of reason":"
[T]he antitrust laws require in the first instance that there be
some effect-actual or intended-on American foreign commerce .... Second, a greater showing of burden or restraint may
14

Id at 444 (noting that it did not matter that the agreements were made abroad).

15 Id.
16 See, for example, Sisal Sales Corp, 274 US at 276; United States v Imperial Chemical
Industries; Ltd, 100 F Supp 504, 592 (SD NY 1951) ("[A] conspiracy to divide territories, which
affects American commerce, violates the Sherman Act."); United States v Timken Roller Bearing
Co, 83 F Supp 284,309 (ND Ohio 1949), modified and affd, 341 US 593 (1951).
17 See Barry E. Hawk, 1 United States, Common Market and InternationalAntitrust: A
Comparative Guide 112-14 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 2d ed 1985).
18 See, for example, United States v Nippon PaperIndustries Co, 109 F3d 1. 7 (1st Cir 1997)
("[Ciriminal intent generally is required to convict under the Act."); HartfordFire Insurance Co
v California,509 US 764,798 n 24 (1993) ("[T]he Sherman Act covers foreign conduct producing
a substantial intended effect in the United States.") (emphasis added).
19 148 F2d at 443.
20
549 F2d 597 (9th Cir 1977).
21
Id at 611-12 ("The effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other

nations' interests.").
22
Id at 613 (referring to this "jurisdictional rule of reason" as "an evaluation and balancing
of the relevant considerations in each case"), quoting Kingman Brewster, Antitrust andAmerican
BusinessAbroad 446 (McGraw-Hill 1958).
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be necessary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to
present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil
violation of the antitrust laws. Third, there is the additional question which is unique to the international setting of whether the
interests of, and links to, the United States-including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce-are sufficiently strong, vis-A-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.2
The Timberlane court didn't tarry on the second element, which,
as it explained, functioned simply to filter out cases too small to be
worth caring about." The court was much more interested in the third
element, which, it said, required that in each case a balance be struck:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties
and the locations or principal places of business of corporations,
the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected
to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to
which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as comapared with conduct abroad."
The Ninth Circuit's approach was emulated by other circuits, particularly in Mannington Mills, Inc v Congoleum Corp.26 So although the
effects test remained vital, it was, until the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California,2' increasingly treated
as a threshold element of a broader comity-driven analysis.8

549 F2d at 613 (internal citations omitted).
Id at 615 n 35 (noting that the quantitative test of substantiality is not based on a formula, but is rather a practical, case-by-case economic judgment).
25
Idat614.
26
595 F2d 1287 (3d Cir 1979). See also In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F2d 1248,
1255 (7th Cir 1980) (refusing to reverse as an abuse of discretion a district court judgment finding jurisdiction that did not employ the factors set out in Timberlane and Mannington Mills, but
suggesting that those factors "certainly provide an adequate framework for such a [jurisdictional] determination"); American Rice, Inc v Arkansas Growers Cooperative Association, 701
F2d 408 (5th Cir 1983) (adopting a similar approach in a case involving extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act). But see Laker Airways, Ltd v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F2d
909 (DC Cir 1984) (rejecting the TimberlanelManningtonMills comity balancing test as judicially
unworkable).
27 509 US 764 (1993).
28
Id at 798-99.
23

24
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Codification of the Effects Test

In 1982, in "a fit of industrial-policy enthusiasm and anti-Japanese
hysteria, ' 9 Congress set itself to the task of legalizing export cartels.
The result was the FTAIA, enacted as part of the Export Trading
Company Act of 1982. 30
Characterized as enacting "a single, objective test" that "will serve
as a simple and straightforward clarification of existing American
law,' the FTAIA largely codifies the Alcoa test, albeit, importantly,
without the intent element. As codified in § 6a of the Sherman Act,
the FTAIA provides that:
This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce
(other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect (A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of
this Act, other than this section.
If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the operation
of paragraph (1)(B), then this Act shall apply to such conduct
only for injury to export business in the United States. 2
Congress expected that the FITAIA would clarify the law. It
hasn't worked out that way. In HartfordFire, its first post-FTAIA engagement with extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court relegated the statute to a footnote: "[I]t is unclear how [the Act]
might apply to the conduct alleged here[, and] whether the Act's 'di-

29 Michael Greve and Richard Epstein, Foreign Headaches, Natl L J 27 (July 12, 2004)
(discussing how recent Supreme Court decisions have muddied the jurisdictional line between
foreign and U.S. law).
30 Pub L No 97-290,96 Stat 1233 (1982) (immunizing export cartels that receive authorization from the Secretary of Commerce). See also FTAIA, 15 USC § 6a.
31 Export Trading Company Act of 1982, HR Rep No 97-686, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 2, reprinted in 1982 USCCAN 2487-88 (emphasis added).
32
15 USC § 6a.
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rect, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect' standard amends
'"S
existing law or merely codifies it."
Fifteen years later, lower courts were struggling with basic questions that Hartford Fire pushed aside: To what conduct does the
FTAIA apply? Does it enact any material change to the effects test?
And there is another, deeper, question about the place of comity in
the jurisdictional analysis. Hartford Fire made note of Timberlane, but
did not explicitly reject its comity-centered balancing test.! The Court
did, however, state that comity considerations would be relevant only
in cases of "true conflict," which it defined narrowly as a situation in
which it is not possible for a party to comply with the law of both jurisdictions.35 Hannah Buxbaum has noted that "the practical impact of
the Court's decision was to reject the interest-balancing approach."" It
is unclear whether this "practical rejection" is equivalent to a formal
one.37 Nonetheless, after the FTAIA and Hartford Fire, courts weighing subject matter jurisdiction have employed a one-dimensional effects test.
C.

Empagran

Empagran arose from a price fixing and market allocation conspiracy involving many of the largest producers of bulk vitamins and
vitamin premixes.3 The conspiracy, dubbed "Vitamins, Inc." by one of
the participants, 39' resulted in overcharges estimated to exceed $8 bil33 509 US at 796 n 23 (declining to delve into a deeper analysis of the Act because the
conduct alleged "plainly meets [the FTAIA's] requirements").
34 Id at 798.
35 Id at 798-99 ("No conflict exists, for these purposes, 'where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both."').
36
Hannah L. Buxbaum, The PrivateAttorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in
Private InternationalAntitrust Litigation,26 Yale J Intl L 219, 235 (2001) (arguing that the public/private conceptual framework used by courts today in international antitrust litigation dooms
the interest-balancing approach since courts reject antitrust claims when disputes more directly
implicate sovereign actions).
37 See Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 Colum J Transnatl L 563, 569
(2000) (noting that Hartford Fire, while appearing to limit use of comity analysis to instances of
"true conflict," nonetheless "hedged its bets as to whether any other aspect of the Timberlane
comity analysis could be used").
38 See DOJ Press Release, E Hoffmann-La Roche and BASFAgree to Pay Record Criminal
Finesfor Participatingin InternationalVitamin Cartel (May 20,1999), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/press releases/1999/2450.htm (visited Nov 20, 2004); Brief Amici Curiae of Professors
Darren Bush, et al, in Support of Respondents, E Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd v EmpagranS.A., No
03-724, *5 (S Ct filed Mar 15,2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 533933) ("Bush Amicus")
("[B]y the end of 1991 at least 20 parent-company manufacturers [were] involved in a conspiracy
involving 16 products.").
39 See Joel I. Klein, The Antitrust Division's InternationalAnti-Cartel Enforcement Program, remarks before the ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting, Washington, D.C. (Apr 6,
2000), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/4498.pdf (visited Nov 20,2004).
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lion worldwide,4' of which a significant portion was suffered in the
United States. The U.S. government reached plea agreements whereby

twelve corporations and thirteen individuals admitted to violations
and agreed to pay fines exceeding $900 million. Eleven individuals
also served prison terms. Cartel participants have also been pursued

by antitrust authorities in the European Union, Canada, Australia, and
Korea, which together have obtained fines of almost $1 billion.' In

addition, plaintiffs in U.S. private lawsuits have recovered in excess of
$2 billion 4 -an amount that, even when combined with U.S. and foreign government fines, still falls well short of even single recovery of
the total overcharge imposed by the cartel.
The Empagran plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint
on behalf of both foreign and domestic purchasers who took delivery
outside the United States. 3 Defendants moved to dismiss the claims
of foreign purchasers. The district court, framing the question as
"whether allegations of a global price fixing conspiracy that affects
commerce both in the United States and in other countries gives persons injured abroad in transactions otherwise unconnected with the
United States a remedy under our antitrust laws," granted defendants' motion.

The district court read the FTAIA to require (1) that "the conduct causing [plaintiffs'] injuries resulted in a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, '45 and (2) that plaintiffs' injuries must "arise" from the same conduct that harmed U.S.
commerce. That the second requirement is redundant of the first isn't
hard to see, especially considering the court's characterization of the
relevant "conduct" as not the unlawful agreement, but rather the particular "overt acts" (that is, the specific price-fixed transactions) that

40 If we account for the time value of money, the overcharge rises to $18 billion. Brief for
Certain Professors of Economics as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, E Hoffmann-La
Roche, Ltd v Empagran S.A., No 03-724, *10 (S Ct filed Mar 15, 2004) (available on Westlaw at
2004 WL 533930) (approximating profits of roughly $13.6 billion in spite of heavy fines in numerous countries).
41 See id at *la (Appendix); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, E Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd v Empagran S.A., No 03-724, *2 (S Ct filed Feb 3, 2004)
(available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 234125) ("U.S. Amicus").
42
See U.S. Amicus at *2. A civil action has also been filed in the United Kingdom. That
action is pending. See Provimi Ltd v Aventis Animal Nutrition SA and OtherActions, 2003 Eng &
Wales High Ct 961 (Commercial Ct) (holding that a British claimant can sue for its entire loss in
the British courts for damages suffered as a result of a breach of European competition law,
irrespective of where the loss was suffered, provided that it had jurisdiction over one of the
claimants).
43 EmpagranS.A. v F Hoffinann-La Roche, Ltd, 2001 WL 761360, *1 (D DC).
44 Id at *2.
45 Id (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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injured plaintiffs. Based on these premises, the district court decided
what it saw as an easy case: "Plaintiffs have not alleged that the precise injuries for which they seek redress here have the requisite domestic effects necessary to provide subject matter jurisdiction."
A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed.4'8 First, the majority
found that the relevant "conduct" was the worldwide agreement, not
specific transactions that harmed the plaintiffs." Noting that defendants "do not contest that the vitamin cartel produced substantial effects in the United States," the D.C. Circuit found that § 6a(1)'s "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" requirement had
been met."
This holding is, of course, correct. The FTAIA refers to "conduct
involving trade or commerce ... with foreign nations."" The FTAIA

amends the Sherman Act; the "conduct" referenced in the statute is,
accordingly, the same "conduct" the Sherman Act makes illegal.
Sherman Act § 1 prohibits every "contract, combination ...or con-

spiracy" in restraint of trade. 2 It is a price-fixing agreement itself, and
not individual "transactions," that is unlawful. 5 Likewise, it is the
agreement that counts as "conduct" relevant in the FTAIA analysis.
The balance of the D.C. Circuit's opinion focuses on the "give rise
to a claim" requirement of FTAIA § 6a(2). The central question, in the
D.C. Circuit's view, was
whether FTAIA precludes actions under the Sherman Act unless
a plaintiff shows that the injuries it seeks to remedy arise from
the anticompetitive effects of the defendant's conduct on U.S.
commerce; or, alternatively, is it enough for a plaintiff to show
that the anticompetitive effects of the defendant's conduct on
U.S. commerce give rise to an antitrust claim under the Sherman
Act by someone, even if not the plaintiff who is before the court."
Put another way, does "a claim" mean "any claim," or "the plaintiff's
claim"?

Id.
Id at *3.
48 Empagran SA. v F Hoffrnann-LaRoche,Ltd, 315 F3d 338,360 (DC Cir 2003).
49
Id at 344.
50
Id.
51 15 USC § 6a (emphasis added).
52
15USC§1.
53 See Summit Health, Ltd v Pinhas,500 US 322, 330 (1991) ("[T]he essence of any violation of § 1 is the illegal agreement itself-rather than the overt acts performed in furtherance of
it.").
54 Empagran,315 F3d at 344.
46
47
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The Second and Fifth Circuits had analyzed this question and
reached opposite conclusions. In Den Norske Stats Qijeselskap As v
HeereMac Vof," a case involving a worldwide conspiracy to allocate
territories in the provision of barges used in constructing offshore oil
platforms, the Fifth Circuit, reading § 6a(2) to limit jurisdiction to instances in which the plaintiff's injury arises from a U.S. anticompetitive
effect, dismissed the claims of a Norwegian oil company that suffered
injuries limited to its North Sea operations:" In contrast, in Kruman v
Christie's InternationalPLC,'7 the Second Circuit allowed to proceed
claims brought by buyers and sellers at foreign auctions subject to a
worldwide agreement to fix auction fees. Section 6a(2)'s "gives rise to a
claim" language, the Second Circuit stated, required only that "the domestic effect violate the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act.""
Adopting a position close to the Second Circuit's, the D.C. Circuit
held that so long as anticompetitive conduct affects U.S. commerce,
the "FTAIA permits suits by foreign plaintiffs who are injured solely
by that conduct's effect on foreign commerce."59 Unlike the Second
Circuit, however, the D.C. Circuit read the "gives rise to a claim" language to require something more than the substantive violation that
would allow a government action. Some injured domestic private
plaintiff must have a claim for parties injured abroad also to have
one.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and-at least nominallyreversed.6' As explained earlier, the Court's decision is based not on
the plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegations, but on a hypothetical. To wit:
"We here focus upon anticompetitive price-fixing activity that is in
significant part foreign, that causes some domestic antitrust injury, and
that independently causes separateforeign injury.""
The Court restates its hypothetical several times," but repetition
doesn't make it fit the facts. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged a
241 F3d 420 (5th Cir 2001).
Id at 427 ("[Tlhe FrAIA... demands that the domestic effect 'gives rise' to the claim.").
57 284 F3d 384 (2d Cir 2002).
58 Id at 400.
59 Empagran,315 F3d at 350.
60 Id.
61 Empagran,124 S Ct at 2372.
62
Id at 2363 (emphasis added).
See, for example, id ("To clarify: The issue before us concerns (1) significant foreign
63
anticompetitive conduct with (2) an adverse domestic effect and (3) an independent foreign
effect giving rise to the claim."); id at 2367 ("We thus repeat the basic question: Why is it reasonable to apply this law to conduct that is significantly foreign insofar as that conduct causes independent foreign harm and that foreign harm alone gives rise to the plaintiff's claim?"). The Court
uses some version of the word "independent" more than twenty times to characterize plaintiffs'
injuries.
55
56
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single conspiracy that "involved the global market for each vitamin or
series of vitamins"'' and that raised the price of vitamins "both within
and outside the United States."' A global product market is, definitionally, one in which suppliers located anywhere in the world can
compete for any particular sale, regardless of geography. The vitamins
involved in Empagran trade in a global market: they can be transported cheaply enough, relative to their value, that suppliers anywhere
in the world can compete for any particular sale.6' Accordingly, the
vitamin conspirators were obliged to cartelize globally: that is, to bring
into the cartel enough of the worldwide supply that the supracompetitive price is defensible against arbitrage.
Not surprisingly, the Empagran complaint alleges that the cartelists sought to do precisely what economic theory would recommend.
The complaint charges that the cartel worked "to eliminate competition ...and to fix the [vitamin] prices and allocate markets world-

wide" 67 by conspiring to "injure and destroy businesses that would
have reduced defendants' illegal market control" and by "coordinat[ing] price increases ...throughout the United States and foreign

countries."69
The disconnect between the Court's hypothetical and the plaintiffs' allegations-which must be credited on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-is troubling. The Court hasn't complied with the spirit of 12(b)(6), but hasn't
exactly violated the letter either. Rather, it has simply ignored the allegations.
But there is a deeper problem: the Supreme Court's hypothetical
will seldom, if ever, be relevant in a private antitrust action involving a
multinational cartel. Harm suffered abroad may be "independent"
when separate U.S. domestic and foreign agreements affect goods that
trade in national or regional markets. In such an instance, there may
be no possibility of arbitrage. How often will this occur? Perhaps the
regional market allocation agreements for heavy-lift barge services at
issue in HeereMac are an example: if the barges spend their useful
lives within a single region, then perhaps harm suffered in the North
Sea is "independent" of harm suffered in the United States.0
64

00-1686
65

See Amended Class Action Complaint, Empagran SA. v E Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd, No
89 (DC Cir filed Nov 14,2000) (on file with author) (emphasis added).
Id

1.

66 See Bush Amicus at *7 (cited in note 38) ("International shipping costs for vitamins in

the 1990s were well under 5% of the manufacturers' price.").
67
Amended Class Action Complaint 2 (cited in note 64).
68 Id.
69
Id I 3(a).
70
See text accompanying note 55.
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In addition, there are narrow circumstances, even in the context
of cartelized products that trade in a global market, where foreign
harm may be "independent." Posit two conspiracies, one limited to
U.S. sales and the other affecting some, but not all, foreign markets.
The U.S. conspiracy involves all or most major suppliers worldwide. If
conspirators are able reliably to detect when consumers are attempting to purchase in a noncartelized jurisdiction, then these regional
conspiracies may succeed-albeit temporarily, as significant and durable regional price differences for a transportable good usually attract

attention. Similarly, there may be instances in which regulatory barriers prevent arbitrage in goods that would otherwise trade in a world
market. These cases may readily be identified.

In most instances, however, cartels dealing in products subject to
arbitrage will be forced to reach a global agreement. And under these
conditions, harm inflicted on U.S. markets cannot be "independent" of

foreign harm. The domestic harm simply would not have occurred but
for the globalization of the cartel.
The Court's interpretation of the FTAIA's text, like its hypotheti-

cal framing of the "facts," is an exercise in abstraction. The Court assures us that "in all statutory construction cases," it "begin[s] with the
language of the statute."7' Yet the Court does not examine the

FTAIA's text. Rather, the Court opens its analysis with a summary
declaration of the statute's ambiguity," and moves immediately to policy concerns- namely, the desire "to avoid unreasonable interference

with the sovereign authority of other nations.""
We will return to the Court's policy analysis. First, however, a few
words on the statute's supposed ambiguity. Various commentators
have remarked that the FTAIA is badly drafted. But poor drafting
doesn't necessarily entail ambiguity, nor does it mean that the statute

as a whole is ambiguous."
71 Barnhartv Sigmon Coal Co,534 US 438,450 (2002).

Empagran,124 S Ct at 2366.
Id.
74 The FrAIA's preamble-the part that determines where the statute's jurisdictional test
applies-is ambiguous. The statute is applicable to "conduct involving trade or commerce (other
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations." 15 USC § 6a. U.S. commerce with
foreign nations that is not import commerce would either be export commerce (to which the
FTAIA clearly applies) or commerce between and among entities operating abroad-a category
of "purely foreign transactions" that the legislative history suggests, see HR Rep No 97-686 at
9-10 (cited in note 31), and the Court in Empagran holds, 124 S Ct at 2365, is also covered.
But there is a word in the preamble with which no court has yet grappled: the statute's application to conduct involving certain types of trade or commerce. The term "involving" suggests
that "conduct" may affect more than one category of commerce. That proposition is certainly
true, as may be seen from the vitamins cartel: price-fixed vitamins were imported into the U.S.,
exported from the U.S., and purchased abroad.
72

73
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Sections 6a(1) and 6a(2) of the FTAIA are not ambiguous. Section 6a(1) limits jurisdiction to "conduct" that has the requisite "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. domestic commerce, import commerce, or the export opportunities of a U.S. exporter. Section 6a(2) further limits jurisdiction to instances in which
the "effect" required to satisfy § 6a(1) "gives rise to a claim" under the
Sherman Act. "A claim," not "the plaintiffs claim."
There is nothing ambiguous about the requirement that the domestic effect give rise to "a claim." The text's natural reading in its
Sherman Act context is to limit jurisdiction to those instances where
the "effect" on U.S. commerce is of the kind-that is, a harm to competition-that the antitrust laws prohibit, and that, as a consequence,
the U.S. may wish to regulate. The requirement of harm to competition
is the traditional test for antitrust injury." And this is exactly the reading supported, with uncommon clarity, in the legislative history.
The House Report states, under the heading "Type of Domestic
Impact," that the language of § 6a(2) is intended to ensure that jurisdiction will arise only where foreign conduct had some harmful, rather
than beneficial, effect on U.S. markets:
[T]he legislation ... could have been read as ignoring whether
conduct has an adverse effect on competition .... Under such an

interpretation, conduct which has an anticompetitive effect which
impinges only on defendants located in foreign nations and
which has a neutral or procompetitive domestic effect would be
subject to the antitrust laws.
The committee did not believe that the bill ...

was intended to

confer jurisdiction on injured foreign persons when that injury
arose from conduct with no anticompetitive effects in the domestic marketplace. Consistent with this conclusion, the full committee added language to the Sherman and FTC Act amendments to
require that the "effect" providing the jurisdictional nexus must
also be the basis for the injury alleged under the antitrust laws.
This does not, however, mean that the impact of the illegal conduct must be experienced by the injured party within the United
States. As previously set forth, it is sufficient that the conduct

So how does the presence of the term "involving" affect the FTAIA's scope? One may read
the statute as applying whenever an unlawful agreement affects any export or purely foreign
commerce, no matter what other effects it might have on U.S. domestic or import commerce. But
the language also permits a second reading antithetical to the first: that the statute does not
apply whenever an unlawful agreement affects any U.S. domestic or import commerce.
75 See Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc, 429 US 477 (1977).
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providing the basis of the claim has had the requisite impact on
...

United States [commerce].76

The same section of the House Report refers approvingly to National Bank of Canada v Interbank Card Association," a decision of

the Second Circuit holding that courts have jurisdiction to hear antitrust claims arising out of foreign conduct if it had the "effect" of causing "injuries to United States commerce which reflect the ...anticom78
petitive acts made possible by the violation." Under this test, foreign

anticompetitive conduct is actionable if it either (1) reduces the competitiveness of a domestic market, or (2) makes possible anticompeti-

9
tive conduct directed at domestic commerce. The first prong addresses foreign cartels aimed, at least in part, at the United States. The
second prong addresses cartels that affect only foreign commerce but

that enable a separate U.S.-focused cartel -by, for example, protecting
it against arbitrage. Neither prong focuses on the plaintiff's injury; jurisdiction depends on injury to U.S. commerce.
The plain language in § 6a(2) fits perfectly with the legislative history and with common sense. The U.S. interest in applying its antitrust

law to foreign conduct is limited to instances where domestic competi-

tion is harmed; accordingly, § 6a(2) withdraws jurisdiction where foreign conduct does not harm the home market. Any remaining doubt
on that score is eliminated by Congress's rejection of language pro-

posed by business groups that explicitly would have prohibited suits
by persons injured abroad.80 Those who would require a link between

U.S. harm and particular transactions that injured the plaintiff are,
therefore, arguing for what Congress spurned. And, perhaps even
HR Rep No 97-686 at 11-12 (cited in note 31).
666 F2d 6 (2d Cir 1981).
Id at 8.
78
79
Id.
80 Business groups offered varied proposals in order to limit the FTAIA's reach to persons
injured abroad. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Hearings on S 795 Before the
Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong, 1st Sess 130 (1981) (statement of the Business Roundtable) ("If conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations does directly, substantially,
and foreseeably restrain trade or commerce within the United States, then the parties engaging
in such conduct shall be liable only for any injury so occurring within the United States by reason
of such restraints.") (emphasis added); Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Hearings on
HR 2326 Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong, 1st Sess 39 (1981) (statement of David N. Goldsweig, General Motors
Corporation) (emphasis added):
This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce with any foreign national
unless, and only to the extent that, such conduct has a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect on trade or commerce within the United States or has the direct, substantial and foreseeable effect of excluding a domestic person from trade or commerce with such foreign
nation.
76

77
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more disturbingly, the argument is based on a determination to see
statutory ambiguity where there is none. Such an approach disrespects
Congress's lawmaking primacy.
II. REVIVING THE JURISDICTIONAL RULE OF REASON
As a matter of judicial forensics, it is not difficult to reconstruct
why the Empagran Court ended up issuing an unconvincing and
mostly irrelevant opinion. Caught between the need to avoid a situation where U.S. courts become the global forum of choice for antitrust
plaintiffs and a statute that, if treated as the sole jurisdictional test,
opens the door to most foreign plaintiffs, the Court did the best it
could: it stalled for time.
Empagranshows that we cannot rely solely on the effects test. We
need, instead, to develop a more subtle analysis that admits foreign
plaintiffs where U.S. interests are directly advanced, but turns away
those claims where we should leave regulation to others. We need to
revive a "jurisdictional rule of reason. 8'
The competing interests that courts must balance are clear
enough. On the one hand, if foreign claimants who lack remedies at
home cannot recover in U.S. courts, there is a risk, as the Court noted
a quarter century ago in Pfizer,Inc v Government of India," of underdeterrence:
If foreign plaintiffs were not permitted to seek a remedy for their
antitrust injuries, persons doing business both in this country and
abroad might be tempted to enter into anticompetitive conspiracies affecting American consumers in the expectation that the illegal profits they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability to plaintiffs at home.y
There is, however, a countervailing dynamic not yet in evidence
when the Court decided Pfizer. Ultimately, our interest in protecting
U.S. markets will be better served if we convince our trading partners
to set up both vigorous government enforcement and the provision of
private damages. Overassertion of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction will not
conduce to that end.
81
See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The United States as Antitrust Courtroom to the
World: Jurisdictionand Standing Issues in TransnationalLitigation, 14 Loyola Consumer L Rev
523, 525-26 (2002) (explaining the "jurisdictional rule of reason" as allowing "no subject matter
jurisdiction unless there is a substantial intended effect on the United States" and the "U.S.
interest is not out-weighed by the interests of the foreign parties and the foreign countries affected by the exercise by our jurisdiction").
82 434 US 308 (1978).
83
Id at 315 (permitting a sovereign foreign nation to sue under U.S. antitrust law).
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Of course, balancing these factors will require a fact-specific
analysis in each case, which may threaten to become, as the Empagran
Court suggested with respect to the Timberlane/Mannington Mills

approachM" "too complex to prove workable." The challenge is to formulate a test that is both flexible and administrable. What follows are
a few notes toward a simplified comity analysis that recaptures most
of the benefits of the TimberlanelManningtonMills approach, without

increasing the risk that courts will be overmatched by the complexities
of a multidimensional test.
A threshold question is whether the narrow compass given to
comity concerns in Hartford Fire and Empagran forecloses the supplementation of a broader comity-based jurisdictional analysis. Hartford Fire likely does not, for the Court in that case stated explicitly
that it was expressing no view "on the question whether a court with
Sherman Act jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity.""'
The Court's decision in Empagranis a somewhat harder case, but
is also best read as not foreclosing an expanded comity analysis. The
Empagran opinion is, as we have seen, limited to an analysis of
whether the FTAIA extends jurisdiction to the claims of foreigners
who have suffered "independent" foreign harm. The Court held that in
such an instance comity concerns militate strongly against jurisdiction.87 But it is important to note that the Court uses comity only to
inform its application of the statute to its hypothetical. It does not
consider whether comity has a role when the foreign harm is not "independent"-which, as we have seen, will be the case for most foreign
plaintiffs. Nor does the Court address whether, having found the effects test satisfied, a court may nonetheless deny jurisdiction based on
comity concerns.
In sum, Hartford Fire and Empagran leave sufficient space for
lower courts to develop comity-based limitations on jurisdiction. The
next question, then, is how courts might begin to reintroduce comity
into the analysis. There are many factors-such as those contained in

the lengthy lists offered in Timberlane and Mannington Mills-that
See notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
85 Empagran, 124 S Ct at 2368-69 (explaining how courts would have to compare foreign
law with American law with respect to how it treats a variety of potentially anticompetitive
conduct and that "[t]he legally and economically technical nature of that enterprise means
lengthier proceedings, appeals, and more proceedings").
509 US at 798 (noting that Congress expressed no view on whether a court should ever
86
decline jurisdiction based on international comity and that the Court "need not decide that
question here" because "international comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in
the circumstances alleged here").
124 S Ct at 2366-67.
87
84
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could be relevant. " An important goal, however, is to simplify the
analysis by identifying a core set of comity concerns that will both be
easily administrable and enable courts to inquire effectively into
whether U.S. interests are advanced by accepting jurisdiction or repelling it. In the remainder of this Essay, I outline three broad principles
that could help organize such an analysis: (1) limiting the expanded
jurisdictional test to cartel claims; (2) taking account, either as a matter of comity or forum non conveniens, of available foreign remedies;
and (3) measuring the U.S. effect of a cartel relative to its effect
abroad. Operating together, these three principles will enable courts
to account for comity concerns without allowing what should be a
threshold jurisdictional analysis to overwhelm the substantive issues
in the dispute.
A. Applying Comity Analysis to Cartel versus Noncartel Claims
Price fixing and market allocation cartels, which have been
termed the "supreme evil" of antitrust,8' are condemned in the antitrust laws of nearly all major trading countries.90 So there will seldom
be a direct conflict in substantive competition policies similar to that
faced in HartfordFire.9'

Obversely, there are large variances among nations in the treatment of other potentially anticompetitive practices, including, most
notably, vertical restraints.9 As a consequence, there is a potentially
greater risk of conflict between substantive rules where foreign plaintiffs come to U.S. courts complaining of injuries arising from noncartel
conduct.
Exploring the application of comity principles to foreign noncartel claims is outside the scope of this Essay, but suffice to say that
comity analysis is made more difficult by uncertainty regarding the
degree of conflict between foreign and U.S. rules. The problem, as the
Empagran Court saw it, is that courts will have to expend significant
resources in determining whether there is a policy conflict:
88
89

See Timberlane,549 F2d at 614-15; Mannington Mills, 595 F2d at 1297-98.
Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 408

(2004).
90 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Report on the Nature
and Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions Against Cartels Under National Competition
Laws 10 (2002) ("OECD Report"), online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/20/2081831.pdf
(visited Nov 20, 2004) ("The laws of most Member countries provide for the possibility of large
fines against enterprises found to have participated in a cartel.").
91 509 US at 797-99 (noting that the alleged conspiracy, while prohibited under
U.S. antitrust laws, was legal in the U.K.).
92 See Wilbur Fugate, 2 Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws § 16.6 (Little, Brown 5th
ed 1996).
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The Sherman Act covers many different kinds of anticompetitive
agreements. Courts would have to examine how foreign law, compared with American law, treats not only price fixing but also, say,
information-sharing agreements, patent-licensing price conditions, territorial product resale limitations, and various forms of
93
joint venture, in respect both to primary conduct and remedy.
We will return to the problem of differing remedies in a moment.
With respect to courts' ability to determine the compatibility of substantive rules, the concerns raised in Empagran are valid, though
probably overblown. Given the substantial convergence of developedworld antitrust regimes, and the relatively isolated and wellunderstood areas of nonconvergence, there will be many cases where
the compatibility of or conflict between foreign and domestic legal
rules, and therefore the related comity interests, are clear. In all of
these cases, comity interests are readily discernable. In cases where
comity interests are not clear, courts may always choose to restrict
their jurisdictional analysis to the effects test. However, it remains true
that because there is agreement on illegality, U.S. courts are less likely
in cartel cases to invade the comity interests arising from foreign nations' commitment to a particular legal policy.
Declining to Extend Jurisdiction in Favor of a Foreign Remedy
Even in cartel cases, a conflict may arise in the application of U.S.
remedies when a plaintiffs home jurisdiction has established remedies
of its own. Comity concerns are most likely to arise when foreign remedy schemes differ from ours. But even where a foreign jurisdiction
offers equivalent remedies, comity concerns may still arise if foreign
plaintiffs come to U.S. courts to avoid foreign procedural hurdlessuch as stinting discovery provisions-that make recovery less likely.
Whether foreign and U.S. remedies are aligned or not, dismissal
on comity or forum non conveniens grounds will often be appropriate
if a plaintiff s home jurisdiction provides adequate remedies - a proposition with which counsel for the plaintiffs in Empagran agreed at oral
argument." An aggressive policy favoring comity-based dismissals
might create a two-tiered system, where foreign plaintiffs from developed antitrust regimes such as the EU, Australia, and Canada are often barred from U.S. courts, while plaintiffs from many developing
countries are admitted. Given the significant damage done by multinational cartels to developing country markets with weak antitrust
B.

Empagran,124 S Ct at 2368-69.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Empagran S.A., No
03-724, *40-41 (SCt Apr 26,2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 1047902).
93
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enforcement programs,5" preserving U.S. courts as a forum for developing country plaintiffs makes sense.
It is important to note, however, that the real impetus for such a
policy is to spread enforcement responsibility and encourage better
overall results, and not to avoid disagreements regarding antitrust
remedies. Indeed much of the supposed disagreement about antitrust
remedies-in particular, about treble damages-is misguided." As
Clifford Jones has noted, "the vision of windfall treble damages in the
United States perceived from abroad falls rather short of reality.""
The U.S. rule does not include provision for prejudgment interest,
whereas the EU compensatory damages regime does, and "[d]epending
on the length of time from injury to judgment ... the lack of prejudg-

ment interest alone can reduce nominally treble damages to single
damages or less." 8

There is significant reason to doubt, moreover, that even treble

damages are sufficient. Adequate deterrence requires the imposition

of penalties that not only remove all of a cartel's supracompetitive
profits, but that also reflect the likelihood of detection." The economic
literature on the risk of cartel detection is scanty. One empirical study
examining U.S. domestic cartels finds, at most, a risk of detection of
between 13 and 17 percent." That would imply that penalties must

equal between six- and sevenfold the cartel's profits for deterrence to

be optimal, and potentially higher if international cartels are more
difficult to detect and prosecute than domestic ones. 10

95
See Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary InternationalCartels and
Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implicationsfor Competition Policy, 71 Antitrust L
J 801 (2004).
96 See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2 Antitrust Law Developments 1208-09 (5th ed 2002)
(noting foreign blocking statutes).
97 Clifford A. Jones, ExportingAntitrust Courtroomsto the World: Private Enforcement in
a
Global Market, 16 Loyola Consumer L Rev 409,423 (2004).
98
Id.
99 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 4.9 at 77-78 (Little, Brown 1972)
(suggesting that damages in excess of compensation are necessary to deter intentional torts
because not all perpetrators are caught).
100 Wouter P.J. Wils, Does the Effective Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC Require
Not Only Fines on Undertakings But Also Individual Penalties; In ParticularImprisonment?, in
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu, eds, European Competition Law Annual 2001:
Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law 411, 422 (Hart 2001), citing Peter G. Bryant
and E. Woodrow Eckhard, Price Fixing: The Probabilityof Getting Caught, 73 Rev Econ & Stat
531 (1991).
101 See James M. Griffin, An Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Characteristicsof
InternationalCartels,remarks before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Annual Spring Meeting,
Washington, D.C. (Apr 6, 2000), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/4489.pdf
(visited Nov 20, 2004) (illuminating the many means of hiding international cartels, such as use of
trade association meetings).
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Yet the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that fines imposed on international cartels in the
late 1990s failed to recover even single damages.ln The OECD surveyed enforcement schemes and concluded that while the laws of
most member countries allow for large fines (and many countries
have actually recovered large fines), fewer than half of OECD member countries provide for recovery of compensatory damages by cartel
victims. '° Even in those countries-other than the U.S.-in which
compensatory damages are theoretically available, they are seldom
awarded in fact.t '
U.S. courts should focus on the interests of domestic enforcement
in deciding whether to extend jurisdiction. And ordinarily, if foreign
authorities recover fines adequate to provide deterrence for their
proportion of a cartel's total activities, a particular jurisdiction's failure to provide for civil damages is of no concern to U.S. antitrust policy. But against the baseline of underenforcement found by the OECD
and others, courts should be cautious in disclaiming jurisdiction.
There are situations nonetheless where deference to foreign
remedies will make sense. The U.S. government does obtain prison
sentences -it did so against several participants in the vitamins cartel
that was the source of the Empagran litigation-and the threat of
prison provides extra deterrence that is not readily quantifiable but
likely very significant (especially considering Congress's recent expansion of prison sentences for criminal Sherman Act violations from
three to ten years)."°' So for cartels where participants have been sentenced to prison terms, courts may allow foreign jurisdictions to determine civil penalties for injured foreign parties without as great a
likelihood of systematic underdeterrence. The same opportunity for
comity-based deference would arise where a foreign jurisdiction has
imposed prison terms. Aside from the U.S., however, only Canada at
present has sentenced individuals to terms of imprisonment, and it has

OECD Report at Annex A (cited in note 90). See also Simon J. Evenett, Margaret C.
Levenstein, and Valerie Y. Suslow, InternationalCartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s, 24
World Economy 1221,1237 (2001) (discussing how in the age of international cartels, "even those
anti-trust authorities that base their fines on the illicit gains from cartelization do not consider
the harm done outside their jurisdiction and so current practices are unlikely to deter multimarket cartels").
cartel
103 OECD Report at 15 (cited in note 90) (noting that compensatory damages by
victims are often considered "as a component of pecuniary sanctions to which cartel participants
are exposed").
104 Id.
108-237,
105 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub L No
1-3,16.
§§
USC
15
amending
665,
118 Stat
102
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done so in only three instances.'6 If we wish to expand the circumstances in which courts may defer to foreign remedies, we should seek
to expand the number of jurisdictions that criminalize cartel activity
and that punish violations with prison terms for individuals. Perhaps
by extending the carrot of judicial deference to foreign remedies, the
U.S. will find more success in convincing our trading partners to expand their enforcement efforts beyond fines.
Courts should also feel more comfortable deferring to foreign
remedies when U.S. or foreign enforcement authorities have explicitly
sought fines based on a cartel's worldwide overcharges. Somewhat
oddly, the policy of the U.S. government, as revealed in its amicus brief

recommending denial of certiorari in HeereMac, is to consider only
affected domestic commerce in calculating fines.'°n The government
states that it may request upward adjustment to reflect foreign overcharges. But apparently this power is little-used: the government cited
only two plea agreements in which fines were enhanced, providing as
an example one conspirator's agreement to increase fines by a paltry

$20 million to reflect foreign price-fixed sales of over $1 billion." In
contrast, the EU has suggested in proceedings related to the vitamins
cartel that it will calculate fines based on worldwide cartel overcharge:

The Commission considers it appropriate [in determining fines]
to appraise the relative importance of an undertaking in each of
the vitamin product markets concerned on the basis of their re-

spective worldwide turnover. This is supported by the fact that
each cartel was global in nature, the object of each was, inter alia,
to allocate markets on a worldwide level, and thus to withhold

competitive
reserves from the EEA [European Economic Area]
market.'°

106 See OECD Report at 11-12 (cited in note 90). The U.S. has actively imposed imprisonment as punishment for cartel involvement, sentencing twenty-eight individuals in 1999 and
eighteen in 2000, with an average imprisonment term of eight months in 1999 and ten months in
2000. Canada imprisoned three defendants, with the longest sentence term being one year; other
defendants were required to perform community service for a specified period. Id.
107 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae, Statoil
ASA v HeereMac V O.E, No 00-1842, *8 (S Ct filed Jan 3, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002
WL 32157022) ("It is the policy of the United States to calculate the Base Fine by using only the
domestic commerce affected by the illegal scheme, and in all but two of the dozens of international cartel cases prosecuted, fines obtained by the government were based solely on domestic
commerce.").
108 Id ("[T]he level of foreign sales was used as an indication of the company's culpability.").
109 Commission Decision of 21 Nov 2001 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuantto Article 81 of
the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, 46 Off J Eur Communities (L 6/1) 65,
COMP/E-1/37.512 (Jan 10, 2003).
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Were the U.S. authorities to adopt the EU approach, courts would find
additional opportunity to defer to foreign remedies.
C.

Reformulation of the Effects Test

Finally, the first element of an expanded jurisdiction analysis, the
effects test, may be reformulated to encompass comity concerns. It is
important first to note that a perceived offense to comity no longer
attends every instance of jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct: the
effects test has now been accepted by many nations-including our
major trading partners-as a valid basis for assertion of regulatory
authority."° Additionally, the U.S. now has international antitrust enforcement cooperation agreements with Germany, Australia, Canada,
the EU, Brazil, Israel, Japan, and Mexico."' While these agreements
are limited to government enforcement actions and do not affect private litigation, "they indicate that tensions related to extraterritorial
enforcement of U.S. antitrust law have eased as other jurisdictions
'2
have become more cognizant of the need for antitrust enforcement. "
So an analysis that uses domestic effects as its starting point does
not in itself raise significant comity concerns-at least in the ordinary
case found in a multinational cartel where foreign harms are not "independent" from domestic harm. And the opportunity exists to reintroduce, in a limited way, comity concerns into the effects test itself.
One way would be to strengthen the substantiality requirement. While
it is impractical to set an absolute threshold for substantiality, it may
make sense to inquire whether a cartel's effect on U.S. commerce is
substantial relative to its effect abroad. Deference may be warranted
when the foreign effect predominates, especially when the relevant
foreign jurisdictions are able and willing to enforce their antitrust laws
in a manner that will provide adequate deterrence.
CONCLUSION

The Sherman Act extends to foreign conduct that affects U.S.
commerce. Yet just because a court may exercise jurisdiction over
such conduct doesn't mean that it should in every instance. There are

110See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 415, Reporter's Note 9 (1987).
ll See International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General
and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Report annex 1-C (2000), online at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (visited Nov 20,2004).
112 Jones, 16 Loyola Consumer L Rev at 420 (cited in note 97) (further explaining how the
EU has adopted "something akin to the U.S. 'effects' doctrine," making the United States' actions more internationally accepted).
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cases for which other nations should be bearing the burdens of enforcement, at least for the claims of their own nationals.
The infirmities of the Supreme Court's opinion in Empagran
make clear that we cannot rely solely on the current one-dimensional
test for subject matter jurisdiction to allocate responsibility. It is too
early still to forecast the revival of a jurisdictional rule of reason, but
the D.C. Circuit and other courts, forced to deal with foreign cartel
plaintiffs in the aftermath of Empagran,may be obliged by circumstances to begin a path back to the case-specific, comity-based analysis
that the Supreme Court has slighted but never fully repudiated.
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